

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00606 01 OF 07 021059Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----087298 021101Z /11

O 020930Z MAR 78  
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0395  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 7 JERUSALEM 0606

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

FROM ATHERTON

U.S. DEL NO. 41

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PGOV, XF, US  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL-MARCH 1

1. SUMMARY: PRIOR TO HELICOPTERING OUT TO ISMAILIA TO SEE  
PRESIDENT SADAT I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL FOR A  
SECOND HOUR AND HALF SESSION MARCH 1 FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE  
OF DISCUSSING THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. WE WENT OVER THE NEW  
ISRAELI DRAFT (ALTERNATIVE B) IN DETAIL AND I ENDEAVORED,  
WITH SOME SUCCESS I BELIEVE, TO DETERMINE ON WHICH POINTS THERE  
IS SOME GIVE, AND ON WHICH THERE IS LESS. IN A NUTSHELL  
I BELIEVE THE EGYPTIANS MAY IN THE END BE ABLE TO ACCEPT  
THE ISRAELI REORDERING OF THE PARAGRAPHS, THE ISRAELI PREFERRED  
INCLUSION OF WITHDRAWAL AND BOUNDARIES IN SAME PARAGAPH  
(PARAGRAPH 3), REPLACING "IMPLEMENTATION OF" IN  
THEIR PARAGRAPH 2 WITH SOME OTHER PHRASE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO  
THE ISRAELIS SUCH AS OUR SUGGESTED "IN FULFILLMENT OF," AND  
THE CHANGE IN PARAGRAPH 6, INCLUDING THE SECOND REFERENCE TO  
"PEACE TREATIES."

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00606 01 OF 07 021059Z

KAMEL AND BUTROS GHALI PUT UP A STIFF RESISTANCE TO THE IDEA OF  
DROPPING THE "INADMISSIBILITY" CLAUSE IN THE PARAGRAPH ON  
WITHDRAWAL, BUT WE GOT A CLEAR HINT AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION  
THAT IF WE CAN GET THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE TO ACCEPTANCE OF OUR  
ASWAN FORMULA IN THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH, THE EGYPTIANS MIGHT  
BE ABLE TO DROP THE "INADMISSIBILITY" CLAUSE IN FAVOR OF  
SOMETHING THE ISRAELIS COULD LIVE WITH MORE EASILTY. THEY

ALSO RESISTED STRONGLY MY PROBE TO SEE WHETHER THEY COULD DROP "LEGITIMATE" AND SUBSTITUTE "PALESTINIANS" FOR "PALESTINIAN PEOPLE." WE DID NOT COME AWAY WITH A NEW EGYPTIAN DRAFT BUT KAMEL AND HIS COLLEAGUES PROMISED TO WORK ON ONE AND TRY TO HAVE IT READY FOR ME FOR MY NEXT (AND LAST) STOP IN CAIRO MARCH 7. AS WE CAME BACK IN THE HELICOPTER FROM ISMAILIA I SUGGESTED TO KAMEL THAT HE MIGHT CONSIDER PREPARING TWO DRAFTS: ONE WHICH THEY WOULD WISH PRESENTED TO THE ISRAELIS, ANOTHER, FOR MY INFORMATION ONLY, INDICATING LANGUAGE THEY COULD MOVE TO IN RETURN FOR SUITABLE CONCESSIONS FROM THE ISRAELIS. AMIDST KAMEL'S AND BUTROS GHALI'S BASICALLY REASONABLE APPROACH TO OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR REACHING ACCOMMODATION ON THE DECLARATION WERE PERIODIC EMOTIONAL MONOLOGUES BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER COMPALINING ABOUT BEGIN'S NEGOTATING TACTICS, DESCRIBING EGYPT'S PRESENT POSITION AS ISOLATED, AND APPEALING STRONGLY FOR FULL AMERICAN SUPPORT. INSTEAD OF TRYING TO NEGOTIATE "OVER WORDS," HE REPEATEDLY URGED THAT WE HAVE A "FULL CONFRONTATION" WITH BEGIN. WHEN ALL IS SAID AND DONE, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE HE UNDERSTOOD OUR ARGUMENT THAT WE SHOULD PERSIST IN THE EFFORT TO ELIMINATE AS MANY MINOR MATTERS IN THE DECLARATION AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN DEAL WITH ISRAEL ON THE CENTRAL ISSUES WHEN BEGIN COMES TO WASHINGTON. END SUMMARY.

2. WE HAD HOUR AND A HALF MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JERUSA 00606 01 OF 07 021059Z

KAMEL IN CAIRO, MARCH 1. PRESENT ON EGYPTIAN SIDE WERE FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL, BUTROS GHALI AND AHMED MAHER; ON AMERICAN SIDE WERE AMBASSADOR EILTS, STERNER, KORN, AND MYSELF.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00606 02 OF 07 021110Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----087375 021112Z /11  
O 020930Z MAR 78  
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0396

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 7 JERUSALEM 0606

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

3. I OPENED MEETING CLARIFYING TWO POINTS THAT HAD BEEN LEFT OVER FROM PREVIOUS DAY. WITH RESPECT TO REFERENCE IN SADAT'S PROPOSED ORAL MESSAGE TO BEGIN'S ASSURANCES TO CARTER ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY BEYOND THE '67 LINES I CONVEYED TO KAMEL VERY HELPFUL INFORMATION IN STATE 52218. WHEN I FINISHED KAMEL ASKED WHETHER OUR RECORD SHOWED WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S REACTION HAD BEEN TO THIS STATEMENT OF BEGIN'S POSITION (I.E. ABOUT PUTTING IN ABEYANCE FOR FIVE YEARS BUT NOT ABANDONING ISRAEL'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER WEST BANK.) I SAID OUR POSITION WAS CLEAR - I.E. THAT THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF RESOLUTION 242 APPLIES TO ALL FRONTS. OUR POSITION LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF MINOR BORDER MODIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM NEGOTIATIONS BUT THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL HAD TO APPLY TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS WELL AS TO OTHER FRONTS. I AGAIN MENTIONED OUR CONCERN THAT IF THE SUBJECT WAS RAISED IN SADAT'S ORAL MESSAGE, THE ISRAELIS COULD WELL BE STIMULATED TO OFFER COUNTER-ARGUMENTS AND THE RESULT MIGHT WELL BE A MORE RESTRICTED DEFINITION OF THEIR POLICY.

4. KAMEL ASKED WHETHER HE COULD UNDERSTAND FROM ALL OF THIS THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE ISRAELI  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00606 02 OF 07 021110Z

CLAIM TO SOVERIGNTY TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I REPLIED THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY IN THESE AREAS. THIS WAS IMPLICIT IN OUR POSITION THAT THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF 242 APPLIED TO THIS FRONT AS WELL AS THE OTHERS. KAMEL ASKED WHETHER THIS IN FACT MEANT WE RECOGNIZED THAT SOVEREIGNTY RESTED WITH THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS. I SAID I BELIEVE THAT WENT FURTHER THAN OUR POSITION. KAMEL ASKED, THEN YOU HAVE NO CLEAR POSITION ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THIS AREA? I REPLIED THAT, ALTHOUGH I WOULD WISH TO REVIEW THE BACKGROUND CAREFULLY ON THIS SUBJECT BEFORE GIVING HIM A DEFINITIVE REPLY, MY UNDERSTAND OF OUR POSITION WAS THAT WE HELD THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THESE AREAS TO BE UNRESOLVED UNTIL A FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT. AFTER THE 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS JORDAN HAD ASSERTED ITS CLAIM TO SOVERIEGNTY IN THE WEST BANK WHICH WE RECONGIZED IN A DE FACTO SENSE BUT NEVER ACCEPTED DE JURE. KAMEL SAID

THAT MUST HAVE BEEN BECAUSE YOU BELIEVED SOVERIEGNTY  
RESIDED IN THE PALESTINIANS. I EXPLAINED THAT I THOUGHT  
RATHER THAT WE FELT THE QUESTION WAS JUST  
UNRESOLVED. I PROMISED TO QUERY THE DEPARTMENT FOR A  
BACKGROUND STUDY ON WHAT HAD BEEN SAID BY THE U.S.  
AT THAT TIME AND I WOULD BE HAPPY TO CONVEY A MORE  
DEFINITIVE ANSWER TO THEM IN DUE COURSE. KAMEL SAID HE  
THOUGHT PRESIDENT CARTER SHOULD "CONFRONT" BEGIN ON THIS  
ISSUE WHEN THE LATTER COMES TO WASHINGTON. I SAID THAT  
IN EFFECT WE ALREADY HAD IN THE SENSE THAT WE HAVE  
TAKEN THE POSITION THAT WITHDRAWAL HAD TO APPLY TO THE  
WEST BANK AND GAZA AS WELL AS THE OTHER FRONTS.  
KAMEL ACKNOWLEDGED THE POINT BUT SAID WE REALLY SHOULD  
TRY TO RESOLVE THIS QUESTION ONCE AND FOR ALL. FOR  
30 YEARS THE ISRAELIS NEVER ASSERTED

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JERUSA 00606 02 OF 07 021110Z

A CLAIM OF SOVEREIGNTY TO THESE AREAS; NOW WITH BEGIN THEY HAD.  
THIS "SHOULD BE KILLED RIGHT AWAY"; OTHERWISE SUCH  
A CLAIM, IF UNCHALLENGED, COULD BE DEVASTATING TO THE  
WHOLE PEACE PROCESS. I REITERATED THAT WE WOULD TRY TO GET  
THE FOREIGN MINISTER A MORE DEFINITIVE READING OF THE U.S.  
POSITION.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00606 03 OF 07 021148Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----087621 021154Z /11

O 020930Z MAR 78  
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0397  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 7 JERUSALEM 0606

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

5. I THEN RAISED ONE FURTHER POINT ABOUT THE ORAL MESSAGE.

WE HAD SUGGESTED THE ADDITION OF ONE SENTENCE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT EGYPT'S CONCERN FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY WOULD NOT CEASE WITH THE EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD ON A WEST BANK/GAZA SETTLEMENT. KAMEL MADE NO COMMENT AFTER MAKING SURE HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT WE WERE DRIVING AT.

6. I THEN MENTIONED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER A FURTHER ASPECT OF THE TALKS I HAD HAD WITH THE ISRAELIS WHEN I WAS LAST IN JERUSALEM. THEY WERE CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO RESUME MEETINGS OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND THEY HAD SUGGESTED THAT IF THERE WERE A PROBLEM ABOUT SENDING A DELEGATION BACK TO JERUSALEM THE TWO COMMITTEES MIGHT CONVENE IN BEERSHEBA AND ISMAILIA RESPECTIVELY. I COMMENTED THAT PERHAPS THE ISRAELIS THOUGHT THIS SUGGESTION WAS RESPONSIVE TO SADAT'S SUGGESTION THAT THE TWO COMMITTEES MIGHT MEET IN BE IN AL-ARISH AND BEERSHEBA. KAMEL SAID HE WAS FRANKLY UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT EITHER PROPOSAL, AND WE DID NOT PURSUE THE SUBJECT.

7. MOVING TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, I DESCRIBED FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER MY ASSESSMENT OF ISRAELI ATTITUDE ON VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THEIR DRAFT. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00606 03 OF 07 021148Z

UNHAPPY ABOUT THE REINTRODUCTION OF THE PHRASE ABOUT THE INADMISSIBILITY OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR. BEGIN HAD FIRST STRESSED THE POINT THAT ISRAEL HAD WAGED A DEFENSIVE WAR IN 1967 AND THEREFORE THIS PROVISION WOULD NOT APPLY, SINCE IT WAS CLEARLY AIMED AT AGGRESSORS. I TOLD THE EGYPTIANS, THAT I HAD CITED THE ARGUMENT TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THE EGYPTIANS THEMSELVES HAD RAISED IN RESPONSE WHICH WAS THAT THE WORDING OF THIS LANGUAGE IN THE UN CHARTER AND RESOLUTION 242 JUST SAYS "WAR" WITHOUT SPECIFYING WHAT KIND OF WAR. BUT, I SAID, THE ISRAELIS ALSO FELT THAT THIS IS A PREAMBULAR CLAUSE IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND THAT PUTTING IT IN THE DECLARATION TENDED TO RAISE ITS STATUS IN RELATION TO THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF 242. I SAID THAT ON THIS POINT I THOUGHT THE ISRAELI ARGUMENT HAD SOME VALIDITY. I SUMMARIZED BY SAYING THAT BEGIN HAD REACTED VERY STRONGLY TO THE REINTRODUCTION OF THE "INADMISSIBILITY" PHRASE IN THE DECLARATION.

8. KAMEL QUERIED WHY THIS SHOULD BE SO SINCE THE PHRASE IS IN RESOLUTION 242 AND "IS BASIC." KAMEL SAID HE REALLY DID NOT SEE WHY THE ISRAELIS WERE SO UNHAPPY ABOUT THIS PHRASE. I SAID THAT THEY HAD OF COURSE THEIR LEGAL ARGUMENTS BUT THE REAL REASON WAS POLITICAL: THEY DID NOT WISH TO AGREE TO ANY LANGUAGE WHICH MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY BE INTERPRETED AS PRECLUDING THEIR NEGOTIATING ALTERATIONS IN FINAL BORDERS IN A PEACE

SETTLEMENT. SINAI IN THIS RESPECT WAS NOT A PROBLEM  
BECAUSE BEGIN HAD AGREED TO THE PRE-1967 BORDERS. BUT  
IT CLEARLY WAS A PROBLEM FOR THE ISRAELIS WITH RESPECT  
TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I ALSO MENTIONED THE  
ARGUMENT PUT FORWARD BY DAYAN: IF THE ISRAELIS WERE  
TO ACCEPT THIS LANGUAGE, THE ARABS MIGHT ONE DAY USE  
IT TO JUSTIFY TRYING TO DEPRIVE THEM OF THE LAND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JERUSA 00606 03 OF 07 021148Z

ACQUIRED IN 1948. THIS AFTER ALL COULD BE SAID TO  
HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED BY WAR TOO. IN REITERATING VIEW  
THAT WE HAD OUR OWN DOUBTS ABOUT ELEVATING PREAMBULAR  
INADMISSIBILITY," LANGUAGE TO LEVEL OF A "PRINCIPLE"  
IN THE DECLARATION, I REMINDED KAMEL IT HAD BEEN  
CONSISTENT U.S. POSITION THAT RESOLUTION 242 DOES  
NOT REQUIRE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES, THOUGH  
NEITHER DOES IT PRECLUDE THIS AS ISRAELIS HAVE DONE.  
BOUTROS GHALI RESPONDED THAT HE SAW NO INCONSISTENCY  
BETWEEN CITING "INADMISSIBILITY" LANGUAGE AND MINOR  
BORDER CHANGES; LATTER COULD BE RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS  
AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES, BUT NOT A RIGHT RESULT-  
ING FROM WAR.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00606 04 OF 07 021231Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----087950 021232Z /11

O 020930Z MAR 78  
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0398  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 7 JERUSALEM 0606

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

9. BUTROS GHALI SAID HE THOUGHT THE INADMISSIBILITY  
PHRASE WAS "REALLY BASIC" FOR EGYPT. I RESPONDED

THAT I THOUGHT IT WAS FULLY INCORPORATED IN THE DECLARATION'S ENDORSEMENT OF RESOLUTION 242.

10. MOVING ON, I SAID I THOUGHT WE MIGHT PUT ASIDE FOR THE MOMENT THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY THE MOST DIFFICULT AND LOOK AT OTHER PARAGRAPHS TO GET SOME FEELING OF WHEREWE MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE MIDDLE GROUND. THE FIRST DISCREPANCY TO NOTE BETWEEN THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI DRAFTS WAS THE ISRAELI PREFERENCE FOR MENTION OF RESOLUTION 338 EARLIER IN PARAGRAPH 2. THIS WAS ALSO A FEATURE OF OUR SUGGESTED COMPROMISE WORDING. WE THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME LOGIC IN THIS ORDERING OF THE ELEMENTS IN THIS PARAGRAPH. WOULD THIS BE A PROBLEM FOR THE EGYPTIANS? KAMEL REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT OUR TEXT, WITH RESPECT TO THE ORDER IN WHICH IT PRESENTED THESE ELEMENTS, WOULD BE OKAY. HE IMMEDIATELY ADDED THAT THE PHRASE "IN ALL THEIR PARTS" WAS, HOWEVER, VERY IMPORTANT FOR EGYPT. WHEN I QUERIED HIM ABOUT THE ISRAELI PREFERENCE OF "ON THE BAIS OF" INSTEAD OF "IMPLEMENTATION OF" KAMEL SAID HE DID NOT THINK THIS WAS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT AND INDICATED THAT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00606 04 OF 07 021231Z

THE EGYPTIANS PROBABLY COULD ACCEPT SOMETHING LIKE OUR SUGGESTION OF "IN FULFILLMENT OF."

11. WITH RESPECT TO THE SAME PARAGRAPH, MAHER NOTED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ISRAELI LINKAGE OF THE LANGUAGE CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL AND BOUNDARIES, WHEREAS IN THE EGYPTIAN DRAFT THESE TWO ELEMENTS WERE CLEARLY SEPARATED. I SAID THE ISRAELIS FELT STRONGLY THAT THERE WAS AN INHERENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO. BUT I NOTED THAT ISRAEL HAD DROPPED THE PREPOSITION "TO" IN FAVOR OF "AND." I SAID I FELT THERE WAS AN INHERENT LOGIC OF PUTTING THE TWO ELEMENTS TOGETHER IN PARALLEL. I SUGGESTED THAT IF THE EGYPTIANS DID NOT LIKE THE PRECISE ISRAELI FORMULATION AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO TAKE THE ISRAELI PARAGRAPH 3, PUT A COLON AFTER "RESOLUTION 242" AND THEN STATE THE TWO ELEMENTS, WITHDRAWAL AND SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES, IN TWO NUMBERED SUB-PARAGRAPHS, WHICH CONFORMS TO STRUCTURE OF RESOLUTION 242. I ALSO MADE THE COMMENT AT THIS POINT THAT THE ISRAELI REORDERING OF THE PARAGRAPH IN THEIR LATEST DRAFT HAD A CERTAIN LOGIC TO IT. KAMEL SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT THE IDEAS I HAD SUGGESTED.

12. KAMEL THEN LAUNCHED INTO AN EXTENDED MONOLOGUE OF COMPLAINT ABOUT ISRAELI TACTICS IN NEGOTIATING OVER THE DECLARATIONS. THIS WENT ON FOR SOME TIME AND HAD A GOOD DEAL OF EMOTION AND REPETITION IN IT. THE GIST OF IT WAS THE FAMILIAR THEME THAT BEGIN WAS TRYING TO BRING THE WHOLE PEACE PROCESS TO A HALT BY ARGUING OVER WORDS IN THE DECLARATION. "HE'S A CRAZY MAN.

HE'LL DESTROY US ALL." KAMEL DID NOT SEE WHY WE SHOULD  
CONSTANTLY TRY TO REACH COMPROMISES WITH THIS KIND OF MAN. "WHY  
SHOULD WE OPEN THE DOOR TO HIS GREED FOR TERRITORY?"  
KAMEL THOUGHT THIS WAS THE TIME TO HAVE A CONFRONTATION  
WITH HIM SO THAT THESE AMBITIONS COULD BE CHECKED.  
EGYPT HAD HAD ENOUGH OF ISRAEL TRYING TO IMPOSE ITS VIEWS.  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JERUSA 00606 04 OF 07 021231Z

PRESIDENT CARTER SHOULD NOT SHRINK FROM HAVING A "FULL  
CONFRONTATION" WITH BEGIN. EGYPT WAS PREPARED TO  
AGREE TO MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATION ON THE WEST BANK, BUT TRYING  
TO ELIMINATE THE BASIC PRINCIPLES THAT TERRITORY  
SHOULD NOT BE ACQUIRED BY WAR WAS UNACCEPTABLE.  
BEGIN HAD TO BE CUT DOWN TO SIZE. BEGIN WAS "A TERRIBLE  
MAN" WHO HAD BEEN A TERRORIST AND PERSONA NON GRATA TO ALL  
OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN THE WORLD UNTIL HE BECAME PRIME MINISTER.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00606 05 OF 07 021237Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----087994 021241Z /10  
O 020930Z MAR 78  
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0399  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 7 JERUSALEM 0606

NODIS

13. I SAID I WOULD ONLY MAKE TWO POINTS IN RESPONSE.  
THE FIRST WAS THAT BEGIN WAS, AFTERALL NOW THE  
PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL. HE HAD BEEN ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE  
AND WE NOW HAVE TO DEAL WITH HIM. THE SECOND POINT WAS  
THAT SINCE BECOMING PRIME MINISTER, BEGIN HAD SHOWN SIGNS  
OF SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGING HIS VIEWPOINT. THE MAIN  
EXAMPLE OF THIS WAS HIS WILLINGNESS, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE  
BEGIN PLAN, NOT TO ASSERT ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST



BANK AND GAZA. THIS WAS IN CONTRADICTION WITH BEGIN'S LIFE-  
LONG VIEW PRIOR TO HIS ACCESSION TO POWER.

14. KAMEL SAID BEGIN HAS TO BE JUDGED BY HIS  
ACTIONS, NOT HIS WORDS. WHILE HE IS SAYING THAT ISRAEL  
DOESN'T ASSERT ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER THESE AREAS HE IS  
CONTINUING TO PLACE ISRAEL SETTLEMENTS IN THEM. IN  
FIVE YEARS, HE WOULD COVER THE WEST BANK WITH SETTLEMENTS.  
THE MAN WAS DANGEROUS. HE SHOULD BE CHECKED WITHOUT  
FURTHER DELAY. BUTROS GHALI ASKED, LESS  
EMOTIONALLY, WASN'T THERE AN INHERENT CONTRADICTION  
BETWEEN SAYING THAT SOVEREIGNTY WAS BEING HELD  
IN ABEYANCE AND AT THE SAME TIME PURSHING NEW SETTLEMENTS IN  
THESE AREAS? I SAID OUR POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF  
SETTLEMENTS MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT IN EFFECT WE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00606 05 OF 07 021237Z

AGREE WITH EGYPT ON THIS POINT. KAMEL WENT ON.  
AT THE MINIMUM BEGIN SHOULD FREEZE FURTHER  
SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY WHILE THE NEGOTATIONS ARE UNDERWAY AND  
HE SHOULD SAY SO PUBLICLY. KAMEL HAD TO SAY CANDIDLY THAT  
HE FELT POORLY ABOUT GOING INTO ALL THESE FORMULATIONS  
IN THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WHEN WE WERE NEGOTATING WITH A  
MAN WHO HAS "CRAZY DREAMS" AND THREATENED "TO PLUNGE THE  
WORLD INTO CATASTROPHE."

15. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD THE FOREIGN  
MINISTER'S STRONG FEELINGS ON THIS SUBJECT. CLEARLY THE U.S.  
HAS A MAJOR TASK IN CONVINCING THE ISRAELIS OF OUR POSITION ON  
THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND THAT THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION MUST  
APPLY TO ALL FRONTS. BUR BRANKLY I COULD NOT HONESTLY SEE  
PRESIDENT CARTER  
HAVING A MAJOR CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL OVER THE  
INCLUSION OR NON-INCLUSION OF THE "INADMISSIBILITY"  
PHRASE IN THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WHEN WE CAN FIND  
OTHER LANGUAGE THAT MEETS EGYPT'S BASIC REQUIREMENTS. IF SOME  
KIND OF ACCOMODATION COULD BE REACHED ON THIS  
POINT IT WOULD BRING THE REAL SHOWDOWN TO THE  
PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH WHICH IS WHERE IT BELONGS  
SINCE THIS WAS THE MAIN ISSUE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00606 06 OF 07 021346Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----088450 021352Z /40

O 020930Z MAR 78  
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0400  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 7 JERUSALEM 0606

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

16. IN A CALMER MOOD, KAMEL ASKED WHY EGYPT SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO ACCEDE TO ANY OF THESE SUGGESTIONS FOR ACCOMMODATION WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO MOVE ON THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH. IF THEY DID "MAYBE WE CAN REVIEW OUR POSITION ON THESE OTHER POINTS." I SAID THAT ON THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH, WE HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS OUR CONVICTION THAT IN THE END WE THOUGHT BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TO MOVE TO SOMETHING CLOSE TO PREIDENT CARTER'S ASWAN FORMULATION. WHILE WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THIS PARAGRAPH, I WOUNDERED WHETHER THE EGYPTIANS FELT THAT THE TWO WORDS IN THE PARAGRAPH, WHICH WERE NOT REALLY VITAL TO THE THRUST OF THE FORMULATION, MIGHT BE DISPENSED WITH. ONE WAS "LEGITIMATE" WHICH I EXPLAINED HAD A BAD CONNOTATION FOR THE ISRAELIS AND IN U.S. OPINION BECAUSE OF THE FUSS THAT HAD BEEN KICKED UP WITH THE U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT OF LAST FALL. MAHER INTERJECTED, "BUT PRESIDENT

CARTER USED THIS WORD HIMSELF." THE FOREIGN MINISTER ADDED THAT EGYPT FELT THAT INCLUSION OF THE WORD "LEGITIMATE" WAS ESSENTIAL. I SAID THE SECOND MINOR CHANGE I WANTED TO RAISE IN THIS PARAGRAPH WAS THE POSSIBLE SUBSTITUTION OF THE TERM "PALESTINIANS" FOR "PALESTINIAN PEOPLE." KAMEL IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00606 06 OF 07 021346Z

THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD WANT TO USE "PALESTINIAN PEOPLE." "PRESIDENT CARTER USED THIS PHRASE, SO WHY SHOULD IT BE DROPPED?". KAMEL INDICATED HE CONSIDERED ASWAN LANGUAGE WEAK TO BEGIN WITH AND SAID THAT EGYPT WOULD FACE A GREAT DEAL OF CRITICISM FROM BOTH THE PALESTINIANS AND OTHER ARABS ON THIS PARAGRAPH WHEN IT FINALLY EMERGED. INCLUSION OF BOTH "LEGITIMATE" AND "PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" WAS THEREFORE VERY IMPORTANT.

17. KAMEL SAID THAT HE WOULD REVIEW OUR SUGGESTIONS AND WOULD TRY TO COME UP WITH A NEW EGYPTIAN DRAFT BUT DID NOT THINK HE WOULD HAVE IT READY BY THE TIME I LEFT. I SAID TIME WAS OBVIOUSLY SHORT ON THIS OCCASION. WE WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO HAVING SOMETHING FROM THEM BY THE TIME OF MY NEXT STOP MARCH 7.

18. BY WAY OF A KIND OF SUMMARY, I SAID THAT BY THE TIME I LEFT TO GO HOME I WOULD LIKE OUR DISCUSSION TO HAVE ELIMINATED AS MANY SIDE PROBLEMS IN THE DECLARATION AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER SAW BEGIN THEY COULD FOCUS ON THE REAL ISSUES, WHICH WERE THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH, THE APPLICABILITY OF WITHDRAWAL TO ALL FRONTS AND THE QUESTION OF SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE FRANKLY HOPED FOR SOMETHING BROADER AND MORE ASSERTIVE ON THE PART OF U.S. POLICY AT THIS TIME. HE THOUGHT WE HAD TO CONFRONT BEGIN ON HIS WHOLE PERFORMANCE SINCE HE BECAME PRIME MINISTER. INDICATING HE WAS SPEAKING IN A PERSONAL VEIN, KAMEL SAID THAT PRESIDENT SADAT WAS FEELING VERY ISOLATED THESE DAYS AND THEREFORE WAS PARTICULARLY LOOKING TO THE U.S. FOR SUPPORT. HE REFERRED FREQUENTLY THESE DAYS TO EISENHOWER AND HOW HE HAD HAD THE COURAGE TO CONFRONT THE ISRAELIS. SADAT FELT STRONGLY THAT CIRCUMSTANCES  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JERUSA 00606 06 OF 07 021346Z

TODAY WERE EVEN MORE FAVORABLE FOR COURAGEOUS ACTION BY THE U.S. I COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS ONE BASIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PRESENT PERIOD AND THAT OF 20 YEARS AGO. IN 1956 THE UN HAD FOUND ISRAEL TO BE THE AGGRESSOR. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE IN 1967.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00606 07 OF 07 021349Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----088461 021351Z /41  
O 020930Z MAR 78  
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
TO SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 0401

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 7 OF 7 JERUSALEM 0606

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

19. KAMEL AGAIN URGED THAT THE U.S. "SHOULD BACK US STRONGLY." EGYPT WAS NOW IN A "BAD POSITION." HE MENTIONED THE CYPRUS EPISODE AND THE FACT THAT THE ARABS WERE INCREASING THEIR ATTACKS ON EGYPT. "WE ARE VULNERABLE -- MORE VULNERABLE TODAY THAN WE WERE A MONTH AGO." IN AFRICA, EGYPT WAS CARRYING THE BURDEN OF CHECKING SOVIET AMBITIONS ALMOST SINGLEHANDED. THE U.S. SHOULD GIVE EGYPT ITS FULL SUPPORT. IF THE U.S. WERE TO TAKE A FIRM POSITION ON THIS QUESTION OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IT WOULD HELP A GREAT DEAL, AND BEGIN WOULD UNDERSTAND WHERE HE STOOD. BEGIN HAD TO BE BROUGHT BACK TO REASON. EGYPT WAS READY FOR MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATIONS IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS BUT NOT THE RELINQUISHMENT OF TERRITORY. HE WAS FRANKLY WORRIED ABOUT THE ISSUANCE OF "SOMETHING LAME LIKE THIS DECLARATION." I DEMURRED THAT I DID NOT THINK A DECLARATION WITH THE ASWAN FORMULATION, IF IT COULD BE ACHIEVED, WOULD BE "LAME." KAMEL DID NOT ARGUE THE POINT BUT AGAIN REFERRED TO SADAT'S SENSE OF ISOLATION. SADAT WAS A GOOD MAN AND A COURAGEOUS MAN BUT HE WAS BEING ATTACKED BY EVERYONE THESE DAYS. HE NEEDED A BOOST. "PLEASE SOLVE THIS DECLARATION  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00606 07 OF 07 021349Z

OF PRINCIPLES FOR HIM."

20. DISCUSSION THEN MOVED TO HORN OF AFRICA WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF A SEPTTEL BEING SENT FROM CAIRO.  
NEWLIN

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, CAT-B, NEGOTIATIONS, PEACE PLANS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 02 mar 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978JERUSA00606  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** JERUSALEM  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 2  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t197803116/aaaaduaq.tel  
**Line Count:** 643  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Message ID:** 6de23dba-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION NODS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 12  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 06 jul 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3143951  
**Secure:** LOCK1  
**Status:** <DBA CHANGED> MCM 20040604  
**Subject:** MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL-MARCH 1  
**TAGS:** PDEV, PGOV, PBOR, XF, US, IS, EG  
**To:** STATE SS MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/6de23dba-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014